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Oberlin Perfectionism and Its Edwardsian 
Origins, I835-I87o 
ALLEN C. GUELZO 
"An impression has very generally prevailed," wrote James Harris Fair-child toward the end of his twenty-three-year presidency of Oberlin 
College, "that the theological views unleashed at Oberlin College by the 
late Rev. Charles Grandison Finney & his Associates involves a consider-
able departure from the accepted orthodox faith." It was an impression that 
Fairchild believed to be inaccurate, and he would probably be horrified 
to discover a century later that the prevailing impression the "Oberlin The-
ology" has made on historians of the nineteenth-century United States 
continues to be one in which Oberlin stands for almost all the progres-
sive and enthusiastic unorthodoxies of the Age of Jackson, from Sylvester 
Graham's crackers to moral perfectionism. 1 But Fairchild, who was one of 
Finney's earliest students in the original Oberlin Collegiate Institute and 
who succeeded Finney as professor of moral philosophy and theology in 
1858 and then as president of Oberlin College in r866, was certain that he 
discerned a far different genealogy for Oberlin, one which ran back not to 
the age of Jackson but to the age of]onathan Edwards. "The ethical Phi-
losophy inculcated by Mr. Finney & his associates of later times is that 
of the elder Edwards," Fairchild repeatedly insisted, and the Oberlin 
Theology, far from being "original," was nothing less than "the theory ... 
presented by various authors, especially by President Edwards ... and by 
his pupil and friend Samuel Hopkins."2 
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This is a surprising claim, since the prevailing currents of interpre-
tation of both Finney and Edwards meet more for the purposes of con-
trast than comparison, and also because the central doctrine of the Oberlin 
Theology-the attainability of moral perfection-seems too optimistic, 
too shallow, and above all too Pelagian to link with the most imposing 
apologist for Calvinism and human depravity in United States intellectual 
history. But Fairchild's claims are not easy to dismiss, if only because hardly 
anyone was in a better position to make an assessment of the intellectual 
dynamic of the Oberliners. Contrary to the conventional characterization 
of perfectionism at Oberlin as an enthusiastic aberration of the Jackson-
ian persuasion, Finney-along with his Oberlin co-adjutors, Asa Mahan, 
Henry and John P. Cowles, John Morgan, James Armstrong Thome, and 
Fairchild-owed a complex but clear reliance on Edwards and the particu-
lar evolution of Edwardsian theology known as the New Divinity, while 
Oberlin perfectionism was predicated in large measure on the Oberliners' 
explication of the famous natural ability I moral inability dichotomy in 
Edwards's great treatise Freedom of the Will and on the famous statement 
of "disinterested benevolence" articulated by Hopkins and the New Di-
vinity. It was within this outline that Fairchild saw Oberlin as "Calvinistic 
in doctrine, after the New England type," and not Arminian, Jacksonian, 
or Wesleyan; and it was within that Edwardsian outline that Oberlin per-
fectionism represented a recoil from, rather than an embrace of, the de-
mocratized and sentimentalized piety of the nineteenth century.3 
Perfectionism in English-speaking Christian theology is most often 
associated with John Wesley and Methodism, and later on, with what be-
came known in American religious history as the "holiness movement." 
However, the term perfection, even in Wesley's hands, was a rather loose-
fitting garment-Wesley actually used a bewildering cluster of synonyms, 
ranging from entire sanctification through perfect love to the second blessinr 
thrown over a collection of ideas which ranged from an instantaneous 
moment of divine sanctification of the soul to a gradual growth in stages 
of perfect love, and drawn from a conflicting array of sources that included 
both High-Church Non-Jurors and Moravian pietists.4 Tracking down 
these disparities has drawn historical attention away from the underlying 
motive for Wesley's adoption of perfectionism, and that was the need, in an 
age of Enlightenment where the acceptance of truth depended on how well 
it could be proven by experience and demonstration, to make Christianity 
as empirically visible as any Lockean primary quality. "Faith implies both 
the perceptive faculty itself and the act of perceiving God and the things of 
God," Wesley insisted, employing a vocabulary of sensationalism which (as 
Frederick Dreyer and Richard Brantley have shown) owes more than a little 
to Locke. "It implies both a supernatural evidence of God, and of the things 
of God; a kind of spiritual light exhibited to the soul, and a supernatural 
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sight or perception thereo£ . . . " Perfection, by that reckoning, was the 
badge of those "who do not limit God"; to the contrary, perfectionists are 
the harbingers of a greater visibility of divine things "when a fuller dispen-
sation of the Spirit is given, then there has ever been known before."5 It is 
that relentless drive to promote the visibility of sanctity and to place it, 
through its visibleness, beyond the reach of question or doubt which clearly 
locates Wesley as a figure of the eighteenth century; and it is that same drive 
which links Wesley in the same century with another great promoter of the 
visibility of Christianity, Jonathan Edwards. 
Whatever else separates Edwards and Wesley, they were utterly at one 
in this regard, for although Edwards would have shrunk from a claim to 
"perfection" per se as a species of enthusiasm, he and Wesley were united 
in making Christianity a matter of visible, perceivable experience. "The rea-
sonable creatures are the eye of the world," Edwards wrote in his "Miscel-
lanies," "and therefore it is requisite, that the beauty and excellency of the 
world, as God hath constituted it, should not be hid or kept secret." 
Since 'God has made the beauty and regularity of the natural world so publicly 
visible to all; it is much more requisite, that the moral beauty and regularity of 
his disposals in the intelligent world, should be publicly visible .... It is as rea-
sonable to suppose, that these will be as publicly visible as the brightness and 
beautiful order and motions of the heavenly bodies ... and the beauties of 
nature in the air and on the face of the earth. 
And seeing that "spiritual beauty consists principally in virtue and holi-
ness," Edwards made the famous and lengthy twelfth sign of"truly gracious 
and holy affections" in the Religious Affections (q 46) to be "their exercise 
and fruit in Christian practice," since "the tendency of grace in the heart 
to holy practice, is very direct, and the connection most natural close and 
necessary."6 The visibility of Christian holiness, however, depended in large 
measure on the power and abilities of the individual to make it visible. 
That presented fewer problems for Wesley than for Edwards; like his Non-
Juror exemplars, Wesley freely embraced an Arminianism which preached 
the unfettered ability of sinners to be converted and lay hands on grace. 
Edwards, however, was fearful of the Arminian route for its potential for 
robbing God of his transcendence, and for the possibility that it would lead 
not to visibility and perfection but to stagnation. Edwards's route to visi-
bility lay instead through his immaterialist ontology, while his route to 
action would lie through the ingenious formula he developed in Freedom 
of the Will (1754) for reconciling human willing and divine predestina-
tion through the famous dichotomy of human natural ability and moral 
inability. 
The great treatise on Freedom of the Will gave to Edwards, and to his 
disciples Samuel Hopkins and Joseph Bellamy, the rhetorical equation they 
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needed to preserve the most ultra definitions of divine sovereignty while at 
the same time justifying the most radical and direct address to the human 
will for repentance, conversion, and adoration. All humanity, argued Ed-
wards, possesses a full natural ability to will and to do, in that all have 
the natural means-arms, legs, brains, reason-that they shall ever need 
for action. But just as no effect can exist without a cause, people only will 
to do things in response to what Edwards called motives, which only God 
controls. What is more, all humanity is afflicted with a moral inability to 
respond to truly sanctified motives, and that, without a divine initiative, 
ensures that the human will never actually makes use of those natural abili-
ties. This guaranteed that the New Divinity of Hopkins and Bellamy would 
be forever wedded to a "consistent Calvinism" which nonetheless still held 
people accountable for the use (or nonuse) of their natural ability.7 
It also led the New Divinity to blaze some new paths of their own: 
the possession of full "natural ability" led them to condemn in the harsh-
est terms the false visibility of "Antinomianism," to call upon sinners to 
"change their own hearts," and to advocate a stern moral rigorism that 
promised that no matter what good sinners might try to do-prayer, Bible 
reading, charity-all was turned to sin by their unwillingness to fully use 
their "natural ability" to first become saints. Ultimately, that same logic was 
what drove New Divinity Calvinism to flirt with perfectionism. "Natu-
ral ability" was what rendered all human beings accountable, and able to 
obey God's laws; full "natural ability" ought then to require people to fully 
obey those laws. Natural ability, wrote Hopkins, requires "love exercised in 
a perfect manner and degree and expressed in all possible proper ways. "8 
The naturally able will had no visible stopping point in the hands of New 
Divinity Calvinism, except in complete and perfect obedience. 
The moment we look away from the New Divinity to Finney and 
Oberlin perfectionism, the kindred resemblance at once becomes apparent. 
Founded in 1833 by the Vermont missionary John Jay Shipherd, Oberlin 
had been organized in a tract of uncleared forest in Ohio's Western Reserve 
as a New England colony and settled by New Englanders from the western 
Massachusetts and Connecticut counties most heavily influenced by Ed-
wardsianism (Fairchild's parents, for instance, had migrated to the Western 
Reserve along with a large group from Stockbridge, Massachusetts) who 
all solemnly bound themselves to a New England-style town covenant.9 
The Oberlin Collegiate Institute had been conceived by Ship herd as a mis-
sionary training enterprise, and it might not have amounted to anything 
more than that had not Ship herd managed to locate a source of funding (in 
the form of the evangelical philanthropists Arthur and Lewis Tappan), a 
president in the person of Asa Mahan (a New School Presbyterian pastor 
from Cincinnati who had cut his theological milk teeth on the most radical 
forms of the New Divinity), and the greatest catch of all, the celebrated re-
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vivalist, Finney. 10 Even so, the Panic of 1837 nearly wiped out the Tap pans 
and Oberlin, and only by extraordinary self-sacrifice and the national 
reputation of Finney did the college survive, attract students, and recruit 
a faculty. As it did, the New England color of the institution deepened. 
Although Finney preferred to efface his early associations with Edwardsian-
ism in his Memoirs at the end of his life, he was actually born in the thick 
of the Connecticut New Divinity country in 1792 and raised among the 
New Divinity-influenced "Presbygational" union churches of frontier 
New York; and he received his mature education in Warren, Connecti-
cut, under the eye of the New Divinity minister Peter Starr, one ofJoseph 
Bellamy's theological pupils. Henry Cowles was another western New 
Englander and a Yale College graduate, like his brother John; the Irish-born 
John Morgan came from Williams College to teach New Testament; and 
James Dascomb, the science instructor, was a graduate of Dartmouth, 
where the heavy hand of the New Divinity was still felt under the presi-
dency of Bennet Tyler. 11 
In fact, the Oberlin faculty would have been surprised to discover 
that, by some accounts, they were less than Edwardsians. "It has never been 
our habit to commend our orthodoxy, by affirming our agreement with 
any human standards," wrote Henry Cowles in the Oberlin Evangelist, 
Oberlin's popular biweekly newspaper from 1838 till 1862. But if pressed to 
it, he cheerfully claimed "that we should choose to name the theology com-
monly known as that of New England ... and as years ago, expounded by 
Edwards, Bellamy, and Hopkins." In contrast to the conventional image of 
the Oberlin Theology, the founders of Oberlin never seriously questioned 
the absolute sovereignty and transcendence of God; even Finney would 
speak of a free will only in the sense that a will is free when it has the moral 
ability to respond to motives for action which God places directly in the 
person's perception. "Human liberty does not consist in a self-determining 
power in the will," Finney wrote, but only in "the power which a moral 
agent possesses, of choosing in any direction, in view of motives." And if a 
will that moved only in response to divinely shown motives seemed to some 
critics to be something less than genuinely free, Finney was ready to explain 
the problem in terms of Edwards's great natural ability I moral inability di-
chotomy. "Natural ability relates to the powers and faculties of the mind," 
Finney explained to his New York City lecture audiences in 1836, and thus 
everyone has the natural ability to repent and at once; "moral ability" relates 
"only to the will," and can be exercised only by a divinely wrought change 
in the will. Finney acquired much of his notoriety in Calvirtist circles from 
insisting on the grounds of natural ability that "a moral agen~ can resist any 
and every truth" and that moral agency "implies power to re~ist any degree 
of motive that may be brought to bear upon the mind"; \\fila( was less 
well noticed was how quickly Finney took it back on the grounds of moral 
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inability by adding, "Whether any man ever did or ever will as a matter 
of fact, resist all truth, is entirely another question." Still, the possession 
by everyone of natural ability was enough to justify calls to repentance and 
enough to make the unrepentant accountable. "So it is explained," noted 
Finney, "by President Edwards, in his Treatise on the Will. ... "12 
It was this which launched Oberlin, as it had launched the pioneers 
of the New Divinity a generation before, on a trajectory which bent in-
eluctably toward perfectionism. II)' their preoccupation with establish-
ing human accountability, the Obefliners began as the New Divinity had 
begun, by eliminating any excuses people might offer for why their wills 
could not be considered free or their choices responsible. People could not 
plead an absence of responsibility because of divine sovereignty because, 
while it was "essential to the very being and nature of God that in the 
depths of eternity, he should have planned and disposed all events," this did 
"not mean that he rules or in any wise acts capriciously." The whole pur-
pose of the natural ability I moral inability dichotomy had been to show 
that no amount of divine control or decree concerning one's moral choices 
logically canceled out the natural ability to choose otherwise, and there-
fore the responsibility for choosing (or not choosing). As Henry Cowles 
explained, Oberlin believed "in the actual interworking of human and 
divine agency" which "takes place without any such friction as dislocates 
the system, or lessens liberty of will."13 Nor could people complain that 
their "nature" or "constitution" predisposed them, through original sin or 
inherited depravity, to certain kinds of behavior or precluded an ability to 
repent. The Oberliners did not dispute that there were "appetites and 
propensities" or "impulses & Passions" which lay beneath the working con-
sciousness and which might even be called "depraved." But none of these 
could be called sinfob--in other words, none of this "depravation" was vol-
untary or moral and therefore could not be blamed for having caused one's 
volitions to become sinful. "These impulses & desires," argued Fairchild, 
"lying back of the will, are not sin-but are temptations to sin. The sin is in 
the voluntary action resulting." This, of course, dashed seriously with Old 
School Calvinism's doctrine of total natural depravity, but Oberliners like 
Samuel Cochran had long since come to the conclusion that this doctrine 
was "utterly absurd." It was true that "infirmities or constitutional tenden-
cies to wrong action, temptations, may be transmitted" through natural 
generation, wrote Fairchild, and to that extent the Oberliners may be said 
to have believed in a notion of inherited original depravity in human 
beings. "But in strict thought and expression," Fairchild added, "sin be-
longs only to the agent who commits it, and cannot be transferred."14 
Anything which suggested that the will of the individual should or could be 
set aside in explaining moral conduct smacked to the Oberliners of yet an-
other flight from accountability. 
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Natural ability not only removed any excuse from accountability; in the 
process it further paved the way to perfectionism by demanding the fullest 
possible exertions of that ability, in terms of both quality and quantity. 
In the first instance, the old Hopkinsian demand for an ethic of disinter-
ested benevolence translated easily into a demand by Finney that converts 
give themselves over to "absolute and universal self-renunciation" in which 
"every sinful indulgence must be crucified, and Christ become all in all to 
our life and happiness." In fact, the Oberliners' preoccupation with natural 
ability only served to raise the Hopkinsian stakes even higher. Without 
sinful natural depravity to blame for one's failings, moral choices were 
no longer allowed to be mixed. "Moral character ... must be either right 
or wrong," declared Fairchild, "No intermediate position is possible." If 
one possessed a natural ability to repent, one ipso facto possessed a natural 
ability to obey God up to the last degree of that ability at any given 
moment. "No partial becoming," warned Fairchild: "the sinner must give 
up sin wholly or he does not do it at all, no withholding is possible in this 
surrender to God. Any reservation is total reservation." Asa Mahan but-
tressed this by developing what became known as his doctrine of "the 
simplicity of moral action," which declared that, despite complex appear-
ances, each volition was really simple in nature and guided by one basic 
object or consideration. In this case, each volition was entirely sinful or en-
tirely virtuous, a proposition which (Mahan added) involves "our special 
attention" to "the r~mark of Edwards upon this subject" and which John 
Morgan was confident "agrees with that which President Edwards urges in 
his Treatise on the Will, Part III, Sec. IV. ... " 15 The result, logically, was a 
"universal & perfect good will" and thus the 0 berliners arrived at the possi-
bility, predicated on natural ability, of moral perfection. As James Harris 
Fairchild remarked, by "forbidding the co-existence of sin and holiness ... 
conversion becomes necessarily entire consecration, obedience, & faith." 16 
It awaited only the trigger of a student revival at the college in October 1836 
to propel Finney and Mahan into public proclamation of the availability 
and obligation of perfection. "That there is a natural ability to be perfect is 
a simple matter of fact," Finney announced for the first time to his New 
York City lecture audiences that winter. "It is self-evident that entire obedi-
ence to God's law is possible on the ground of natural ability .... "17 
The image of Oberlin perfectionism which emerges from these texts 
spreads itself far wider than a simple frontier progressivism, and includes 
at its core a series of rigidly logical constructs, demanding a self-critical life 
of the most exhausting and exacting moral strenuousness and based (to a 
largely unsuspected degree) on the presumption of the Edwardsian concept 
of fully accountable natural ability. "What is perfection?" Finney asked, 
then replied in 1837: "The law itself goes no further than to require the right 
use of the powers you possess, so that it is a simple matter of fact that you 
\ 
166 I ALLEN c. GUELZO 
possess natural ability, or power, to be just as perfect as God requires." This 
turned Oberlin perfectionism, as it had turned the New Divinity, into a 
kind of anti-antinomianism, a species of moral rigorism designed to force 
saints and sinners into a full realization of the obligations and opportunities 
of natural ability. "By entire sanctification, I understand the consecration 
of the whole being to God," wrote Finney in the Oberlin Evangelist. "Do 
nothing, be nothing, buy nothing, sell nothing, possess nothing, do not 
marry nor decline marriage, do not study nor refrain study, but in a spirit of 
entire devotion to God."18 There was no relaxation in Finney's model of the 
Christian: the key words of the Oberliners were law and duty, not grace and 
certainly not rest. "What is perfection in holiness?" asked Mahan. "Perfection 
in holiness implies a full and perfect discharge of our entire duty, of all ex-
isting obligations-in respect to God and all other beings." In the simplest 
terms, "Moral perfection" was "simply inward & outward sincere performance 
of all duty." 19 
This might have been all well and good for Finney and Mahan, 
who were "not satisfied to merely live without positive disobedience' but 
who wanted to press "to the highestdegree of likeness to God," but it seemed 
to offer to more ordinary mortals no more hopeful prospect than "con-
stant battling with every opposition." What saved Oberlin perfection from 
demanding more than human flesh could normally sustain was the re-
minder that natural ability and moral accountability extended only to "a 
perfect conformity of the will to God's law, or willing right." Perfection was 
a rule which applied strictly to the conduct of the will-to self-conscious 
volitions-as the only moral faculty or attribute which humans exercised. 
"Sin and holiness are confined to the attitude or action of the will," accord-
ing to Fairchild. "Evil tendencies or impulses, in the nature, are tempta-
tions, not sin; and good impulses are not virtue." It was possible, therefore, 
to have benevolent feelings or inclinations, but they counted for nothing 
beside the demands of the Oberliners until they were translated into action; 
likewise, it was possible to be tempted, in the sense that some "appetite" or 
"passion"-say, for sexual or material satisfaction-might stimulate a self-
ish or immoral urge for disobedience of the divine law. "But, in such cases," 
explained Finney, "the sin is not wilful, in the sense of being deliberate 
or intentional ... it is rather a slip, an inadvertency, a momentary yield-
ing under the pressure of highly excited feeling," and hence is not really 
counted as a sin at all. 20 
Thus, no matter how forbidding their brand of perfection seemed, the 
Oberliners were at pains to make clear that perfection did not mean that 
one could not make mistakes, nor did it mean that one could not experi-
ence temptation or even make moral misjudgments based on one's "natu-
ral" faculties of perception and reason. What it meant was that one did not 
act-that the will did not execute-on those temptations or misjudgments, 
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since, after all, it was only on the abilities of the will that freedom and ac-
countability could be assessed. "However excited the states of the sensibility 
may be," cautioned Finney, "if the will does not yield, there is strictly no 
sin." Finney unwittingly illustrated this distinction in the spring of 1836 
when he urged Arthur Tappan not to jeopardize the antislavery cause by 
agitating too publicly for the social integration of the races. "I admit that 
the distinction on account ofcolor & some peculiarities of physical Or-
ganization is a silly & often wicked prejudice," Finney conceded. The key 
word was often, for such a prejudice would only be genuinely wicked if 
one was naturally able to think otherwise; whereas "a man may entirely 
from constitutional taste be unwilling to marry a colored woman or have a 
daughter marry a colored man & yet be a devoted friend of the colored 
people"-and still be entirely sanctified, too, since a "taste," unlike the will, 
cannot help being anything other than what it isY 
This, as the Oberliners were eager to point out, set them off decisively 
from the perfectionism being practiced by come-outer communities like 
the Shakers and the Amana brethren, or by spiritual permissives like John 
Humphrey Noyes. Finney was appalled that "so many, that have embraced 
the doctrine of entire sanctification, have coupled it with the errors of 
the perfectionists," which Finney dismissed as "the most loathesome form 
of fanaticism that ever existed." The Oberlin doctrine of perfection and its 
"doctrine of the unity or simplicity of moral action," insisted Fairchild, "has 
been maintained by Theologians ofNew England, and cannot be consid-
ered original here."22 But Finney was just as eager to distance himself from 
the Methodists, the other major claimant, through Wesley, to perfection. 
Both Finney and Mahan read Wesley's Plain Account and had numerous 
direct dealings with Methodism {it is likely, for instance, that Finney copied 
the device of the celebrated "anxious bench" from Methodist camp meet-
ings, although he cast his rationale for its use in terms of Edwardsian 
"natural ability" rather than Wesleyan free will). But the Oberliners rejected 
Wesley's construction of perfection as "superficial" and bound "almost al-
together to states of the sensibility'' rather than the intellect. Finney was also 
offended by Wesley's insistence that perfection sprang from "that aid of the 
Holy Spirit" in "what the Arminians call a gracious ability, which terms are 
a manifest absurdity." If ability carne by grace, then without grace the entire 
human race was naturally unable to obey God and had a perfect excuse for 
its sinfulness. "If I rightly understand him," Finney wrote about Wesley, 
"he makes perfection to consist in just what you do with the exception of 
freedom from mistake." The Oberlin Evangelist attacked the Methodists as 
a "hindrance to evangelical piety'' because Methodism "has no taste at all 
for the solid indoctrination of Puritan times-but an insatiable itching for 
something that will put good feeling into the heart." Thus Finney could 
"by no means adopt" the perfectionism of the Wesleyan writers, " & few 
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Calvinistic Ministers I bdieve have had more Collision with them than 
myself .... "23 
Surprisingly for most modern commentators, the Methodists were 
inclined to agree with Finney's distinction between Wesleyan and Ober-
lin perfection. The American theorist of Methodist perfectionism, George 
Peck, insisted that "Christian perfection ... does not imply perfect obedi-
ence to the moral law," and the Oberlin theory consequently "is under-
stood by their opponents to differ in this respect from the Wesleyan theory." 
The Oberliners, in fact, "have finally taken up views essentially defective, 
and views which, as Wesleyans, we can have no sympathy." Daniel Denison 
Whedon, the editor of the influential Methodist Quarterly Review who had 
been a Finney convert but had chosen to follow Wesley instead, attacked 
Finney's perfectionism as mere "New Divinity ... on every point," full of ' 
"perplexity and contradiction."24 
In fact, it was on precisely the issue of "gracious ability'' that Finney 
and Mahan came to a dramatic falling out in the 1840s, as Mahan's personal 
experience of perfection became interlocked with what Mahan called 
"the baptism of the Holy Ghost." Mahan, whose personal connections with 
the Methodists were substantially more numerous than Finney's, came, to 
see perfection as a second experience of conversion, "a work wrought in us 
by the Holy Spirit" and not a product of natural ability. By the mid-184os, 
he was advising his Oberlin colleagues that "when our Methodist brethren 
speak of 'indwelling sin,' and pray to be delivered from it, they use lang-
uage perfectly Scriptural and proper, and which, I think, Calvinists of the 
New School have unwisely dropped." The more Mahan spoke of perfec-
tion as "an instantaneous work,'' the more Finney and the other Oberliners 
suspected that Mahan was making perfection over into a matter of natural 
inability, which therefore offered a ground of excuse to every moral laggard 
to claim helplessness in obeying divine law.25 Finney broadly suggested that 
Mahan had been deluded by the Methodists into thinking that "the Spirit 
leads the people of God by impressions on their sensibility or feelings" or 
other "constitutional" faculties rather than "obedience to the demands of 
reason or to the law of God as it lies revealed in the reason." Fairchild sec-
onded Finney's condemnation of Mahan by disputing "the idea of a defi-
nite experience marking the instant of entire sanctification," and he too 
suggested that this led people into a "form of religious life which is much 
below holiness." James Armstrong Thome distanced the Oberlin Evangelist 
from what was already being called in 186o "the higher life" by insisting that 
"there is but one sort of Christian life-that which is lived by the faith of 
the Son of God." As a result, beginning in 1844, the Oberlin faculty began 
a steady campaign to oust Mahan from the presidency of the college, and 
in August 1850 they succeeded. In time, Mahan converted outright to 
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Methodism, which only confirmed the Oberliners in their assertion that 
Oberlin's perfection was another thing indeed from Wesley's.26 
Finney's most fundamental objection to Mahan's "baptism of the Holy 
Ghost" was the loss of the legal imperative for moral perfection, which 
was also what the Oberliners most feared from antinomianism. What 
Finney saw in Mahan was, in effect, a privatization of holiness, turned this 
time into a personal and ineffable experience which made demands only 
upon the interior life of the individual. Despite the stage-show para-
phernalia of the "new measures" and the "anxious bench," Finney's rhetoric 
remained firmly rooted in the eighteenth century's use of rationalized public 
communication between autonomous individuals to create consensus. Ac-
cordingly, Finney's perfectionism conceived of holiness as a quality to be 
produced by a logical movement from rational propositions to action, 
whereas in Mahan's hands perfectionism was turning into a holiness to be 
consumed, a personalized commodity whose need was created by the "sen-
sibility or feelings." What sharpened this contrast was Finney's appre-
hension that, against the background of the market revolution which was 
transforming United States society during the very decades of the 1830s and 
1840s when Oberlin perfectionism was being articulated, the Finneyite ver-
sion of visible holiness would be the one with which the society would grow 
increasingly uncomfortable. 27 
Finney and the Oberliners, fearing this and resenting its implications, 
railed unceasingly against the consumerization and privatization of piety. 
"How much evil is done by temporizing and keeping out of view the great 
and numberless points of difference between Christianity and the spirit 
of the world?" asked Finney. "Is it not most manifest that a want of thor-
oughly taking up and pressing this subject of entire consecration upon 
Christians in revivals of religion, is the very reason why they decline and 
react to the great dishonor of the Savior?" Finney was aware of the voices 
which "objected that Christians should leave human governments to the 
management of the ungodly," but he countered, "The promotion of public 
and private order and happiness is one of the indispensable means of saving 
souls." By making Christianity legally and rigorously visible, the Oberlin-
ers hoped to keep down the rising wall between public and private in a con-
sumer-driven society-and nothing stymied them more than to know that 
they were failing. "Men are put in nomination for president; how few care 
to inquire whether they are licentious or not," complained Henry Cowles, 
as he watched Christianity rendered politically invisible. "Whether they 
are for virtue, or no virtue; for moral purity, or no moral purity, is a small 
affair." But Oberlin College, in the end, could not even keep Oberlin per-
fect. In 1855, an Episcopal parish-representing a denomination whose 
wealth and status were the very embodiment of commercial success in U.S. 
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society-was opened in Oberlin, over the college's impotent complaints. 
Finney came to suspect Fairchild of half-heartedness in the pursuit of holi-
ness, and eventually came to dread the prospect of leaving the college in 
Fairchild's hands; and Finney even came to mistrust Edwards, turning 
the essays in his Lectures on Systematic Theology in 1846 and 1847 into criti-
cisms of Edwards for not having given more space to the demands of 
natural ability.28 
If Oberlin perfectionism was a failure, however-and as a living force, 
it really died with Finney, although Fairchild would have surprised him by 
the consistency with which he upheld the old arguments in the 188os-
it was an important failure. The demonstrable linkages between Oberlin 
and the eighteenth-century Edwardsians demonstrate the remarkable per-
sistence of Edwards's potent theological formulae, especially on freedom of 
the will. At the same time, the Oberlin propensity to overdramatize natural 
ability beyond what all but its apologists would call Calvinism and to make 
perfection (which in the hands of the New Divinity had been little more 
than a logical possibility) their central theme underscores the degree to 
which the Oberliners found no easy method of transferring the agenda of 
the Edwardsians to the cultural climate of the antebellum republic. Still, 
Finney's demand for a holiness which would be visible and public rather 
than privatized and sentimental did not entirely lose its voice, even within 
the modern holiness movement. This raises an interesting question, not 
just about Finney's connections to the modern holiness movement but also 
about the historical diversity of the holiness movement itself. It may be a 
mistake to rest so much of the origins of the holiness movement on Wesley 
and Methodism, for as Donald Dayton and Bruce Moyer have suggested, 
the moral and ethical demands of the most radical strains of the holiness 
movement are representative of a more rigorous version of visible Chris-
tianity that runs back through Finney.29 But, to the surprise of some of its 
modern proponents, this also means that the most ethically demanding 
variations of holiness theology may owe more, through Finney, to Edwards-
ianism and the New England Calvinist theological tradition than they have 
realized. 
Oberlin perfectionism was not, in that sense, a forward-looking, demo-
cratic, or even revolutionary doctrine. Whatever the other influences on it, 
its most important intellectual roots lay in the eighteenth century, not 
the nineteenth, and it owed its distinctive architecture much more to Jona-
than Edwards than Andrew Jackson. At a time when the market revolution 
seemed intent on privatizing and sentimentalizing piety for the purpose of 
consumption, Oberlin asserted the public claims of Edwardsian moralism 
and disinterested benevolence on the will, not the feelings. Perhaps, like 
the New Divinity, Oberlin perfectionism had no chance of success in the 
real world of the nineteenth century; perhaps it was only predicated on an 
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arrangement of terms and signs that could only have worked in a small 
colony of New Englanders in rural Ohio. But to believe in a world of 
visible signs is, after all, the ultimate Edwardsian virtue. 
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